Marxists typically attributed the start of the war to
imperialism. "Imperialism," argued Lenin, "is the monopoly stage of capitalism." He thought the monopoly capitalists went to war to control markets and raw materials.
[25]
Britain especially with its vast worldwide
British Empire was a main example, although it entered the war later than the other key players on the issue of Belgium. Britain also had an "informal empire" based on trade in neutral countries. It grew rich in part from its success in trade in foreign resources, markets, territories, and people, and Germany was jealous because its much smaller empire was much poorer. John Darwin argues the British Empire was distinguished by the adaptability of its builders. Darwin says, "The hallmark of British imperialism was its extraordinary versatility in method, outlook and object." The British tried to avoid military action in favour of reliance on networks of local elites and businessmen who voluntarily collaborated and in turn gained authority (and military protection) from British recognition.
[26] France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy all hoped to emulate the British model, and the United States became a latecomer in 1898. In all countries the quest for national prestige strengthened imperial motives. Their frustrated ambitions, and British policies of strategic exclusion created tensions. Commercial interests contributed substantially to rivalries during the
Scramble for Africa after 1880. Africa became the scene of sharpest conflict between certain French, German and British imperial interests.
Rivalries for not just colonies, but colonial trade and trade routes developed between the emerging economic powers and the incumbent
great powers. Although still argued differently according to historical perspectives on the path to war, this rivalry was illustrated in the
Berlin-Baghdad Railway, which would have given German industry access to Iraqi oil, and German trade a southern port in the
Persian Gulf. A history of this railroad describes the German interests in countering the British Empire at a global level, and Turkey's interest in countering their Russian rivals at a regional level.
[27] As stated by a contemporary 'man on the ground' at the time, Jastrow wrote, "It was felt in England that if, as Napoleon is said to have remarked, Antwerp in the hands of a great continental power was a pistol leveled at the English coast, Baghdad and the Persian Gulf in the hands of Germany (or any other strong power) would be a 42-centimetre gun pointed at India."
[28] On the other side, "Public opinion in Germany was feasting on visions of Cairo, Baghdad, and Tehran, and the possibility of evading the British blockade through outlets to the Indian Ocean."
[29] Britain's initial strategic exclusion of others from northern access to a Persian Gulf port in the creation of
Kuwait by treaty as a protected, subsidized client state showed political recognition of the importance of the issue.
[30] On June 15, 1914, Britain and Germany signed an agreement on the issue of the Baghdad Railway, which Britain had earlier signed with Turkey, to open access to its use, to add British representation on the Board of the Railway, and restrict access by rail to the Persian Gulf.
