Schlieffen Plan
Germany, in contrast to Austria-Hungary, had by 1905 no real territorial goals within Europe. But Germany's military-strategic situation was poor as Austria-Hungary was a weak ally and France and Russia grew closer. Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary were able to increase spending upon their armed forces due to deadlock in their countries' legislatures. This meant that Germany's strategic situation worsened as both France and Russia continually increased their military spending throughout this period. Accordingly, the improvement of the Franco-Russian forces is not considered to be part of an 'arms race'.
The German General Staff under Count & General Alfred von Schlieffen devised three different deployment plans and operational-guides for war. Two addressed the case of a war with a Franco-Russian alliance and reconciled a defensive strategy with counter-offensive operations. Aufmarsch II West favoured a counter-offensive against the French offensive before moving to deal with the Russian and Aufmarsch I Ost favoured defeating the Russian offensive before moving to deal with the French. The greater density of railway-infrastructure in the west meant that Schlieffen himself favoured Aufmarsch II West as it would allow a greater force to be deployed there and thus a greater victory to be won over the French attackers.[60]
But the third plan, Aufmarsch I West or 'The Schlieffen Plan', detailed an offensive operation. This plan catered for an isolated Franco-German war in which Italy and Austria-Hungary would side with Germany but Russia would remain neutral. This deployment plan was made with an offensive operation through the southern Netherlands and northern Belgium in mind, with Italian and Austro-Hungarian forces being expected to defend Germany itself during this operation. Ideally the French Army would stand fast against the German army and have a large part of its force enveloped and forced to surrender. But if the French retreated then the German army could pursue and breach France's 'second defensive area', reducing its defensive value.[61]
However, Aufmarsch I West became increasing unsuitable as it became clear that an isolated Franco-German war was an impossibility. With Russia and Britain both expected to participate, Italian and Austro-Hungary troops could not be used to defend Germany as per the plan. Moreover, East Prussia and the north-German coastline would be completely undefended as the entire German army would be deployed west of the Rhine. Accordingly, Aufmarsch I West was effectively retired shortly after Schlieffen himself did so in 1905.
Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, did not think that a defensive strategy suited Germany's strategic needs. He decided that the offensive operation of Aufmarsch I West could be applied to the plan Aufmarsch II West, even though no Italian or Austro-Hungarian help would be forthcoming and at least a fifth of the German Army would have to be deployed elsewhere to defend against British raids and a Russian offensive against East Prussia. Holmes is of the opinion that this force was too weak to breach the French 'second fortified area', meaning that if the French Army chose to retreat rather than stand its ground then the entire operation would fail to appreciably improve Germany's strategic situation (as per Schlieffen's goals for such an operation, albeit following on from the Aufmarsch I West deployment).[62]
The significance of German War Planning is that despite having a number of alternatives Moltke chose to launch an offensive that he should have known could not achieve its nominal objectives[63] - though Tuchman has noted that Moltke was one of the few senior military figures to consider a long war, and despite the failure of the offensive German forces did manage to occupy economically important Franco-Belgian territory.[54] Most of the deployments and operations available to him, including Aufmarsch II Ost which was of his own devising, were both defensive and could decisively alter the strategic balance in Germany's power (if executed successfully) through the destruction of the Franco-Russian Entente's attacking forces. Moltke's choice was particularly dangerous given that the main French deployment plan, Plan XVII, was designed specifically to counter the Schlieffen Plan. Plan XVII deployed the bulk of the French Army on the Franco-Belgian border, allowing an offensive operation through southern Belgium and into Germany. If successful, this would have trapped the German Army in northern Belgium. The adoption of Plan XVII in 1913 was combined with a diplomatic initiative to ensure that the Russians would launch an invasion of East Prussia to coincide with it. Accordingly, the first battles of the war were fought in Germany, southern Belgium, and East Prussia.
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